ABSTRACT Smart home is one of the key applications of the Internet of Things (IoT), which allows users to control the smart devices in their houses through the Internet. However, a smart home system also faces severe challenges in terms of privacy and confidentiality when users are allowed to remotely access it. Despite the recent research efforts on authentication schemes to improve the security aspects of a smart home, there are still unsolved problems. On the one hand, most of the existing schemes focus on secure authentication and communication via a trusted third party without taking its privacy leakage into consideration. On the other hand, many protocols enable the users to directly authenticate themselves to a large number of smart devices in the smart home network, which is often inefficient and inconvenient. To cope with these issues, we propose a smart home system model based on Internet services, like if this then that (IFTTT), and design an anti-tracking mutual authentication scheme with a key agreement element in it. Specifically, our scheme introduces an IFTTT home gateway as the control commands' executor and the security guard to allow a user to remotely access a smart home system privately. The proposed scheme employs the elliptic curves' cryptography (ECC) algorithm, nonces, XOR, and cryptographical hash functions to achieve mutual authentication with security features, such as anonymity and perfect forward security. The security analysis and performance comparison results demonstrate that the proposed scheme achieves secure and private authentication.
presence of an individual at a given time [8] ; an adversary could remotely gain access to the monitoring system of a user's Smart Home [3] ; and a user's profile, such as photos and identities, could leak out from the Smart Home application server [4] .
To enhance the security of remote communications to Smart Homes, various authentication schemes have been developed. These schemes may be classified into three categories: third party authentication, smart devices authentication, and home gateway authentication. Third party authentication was the first proposed, which relies on a third server to authenticate a remote user to access a Smart Home [5] , [20] , [31] . For example, Vaidya and Park [20] and Jeong et al. [31] introduced an integrated authentication server (IAS) to authenticate a remote user and to send a ticket (including the session key with a home gateway) to him. The authenticated user sends the ticket to the home gateway and comes to an agreement on the session key. However, since IAS is shared among all users, it will be the first object that is subject to attacking by the adversaries. Also, the IAS is maintained by a third party which leaves additional vulnerabilities. To avoid the threats above, researchers have developed smart devices authentication, which focuses on authenticating a remote user by the smart devices directly with or without the help of a trusted third party [9] [10] [11] [12] . The current generation of IoT devices in Smart Homes are vulnerable to attacks in a number of ways [13] , such as reflection attack, domain name system (DNS) spoofing, distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks based on Internet control message protocol (ICMP). Further, when a home has a large number of smart devices (e.g., more than 500), these devices' authentication inevitably becomes more vulnerable to attack [2] . These have led to home gateway authentication schemes, in which a home gateway authenticates a remote user for accessing smart devices [14] . The home gateway, as a security guard of smart devices in a smart home system, and as a private property of a user, generally achieves a stronger security. However, the scheme by Wazid et al. [14] places the security-base on the registration authority (RA) completely, leaving the home gateway alone on the Internet and making the remote users to change the session key with each smart device. Thus, this scheme must prevent attacks from the RA and the Internet, which has a low efficiency as the number of smart devices increases.
On the other end, a type of Internet services, IFTTT (IF This Then That), which acts as an interface between a user's phone and the smart home devices [5] , [18] , [32] , has attracted significant attentions recently. IFTTT makes it convenient for a user to remotely manipulate the smart devices and configure the smart home through various IFTTT recipes. IFTTT recipes are the ''If this (condition) then that (action)'' statements, like ''If a family member is at home, then turn on the air conditioner.'' Examples of some recipes are shown in Table 1 [5] . IFTTT provides an alternative way to save users' time and efforts on routine but repetitive activities [15] , and is considered a promising framework for [5] .
future Smart Homes [18] . However, in the current IFTTT framework [5] , [18] , a user's smart home system depends completely on the IFTTT server, in which the user's account and recipes are stored. Basically, schemes build on the IFTTT framework is a type of third party authentication schemes.
Note that existing research has developed tiptop authentication between smart devices and a home gateway within the home network [16] , [21] , [22] . Exploiting the convenience that IFTTT could provide, we propose an IFTTT-based Smart Home system in which an IFTTT home gateway is added as an independent security guard. Introducing an IFTTT home gateway into a Smart Home system is not a trivial task; it must sufficiently address three critical challenges: 1) Threats from a compromised IFTTT server. An IFTTT server is an entity run by a third party. In traditional schemes, the third party server is often considered as a fully trusted entity that is sufficiently secure to resist all kinds of attacks and has the ability and loyalty to process and store all secret information for smart devices and users. However, such assumptions are not necessarily true, since incidents of servers' leaking users' private data do occur frequently [37] [38] [39] . A compromised IFTTT server would be a significant privacy threat to the Smart Homes. 2) Security weakness from exposing an IFTTT home gateway to the Internet. Because of cost and other practical considerations, the available resources of an IFTTT home gateway are not as abundant as those of a third party server. Consequently, authenticating a remote user using an IFTTT home gateway alone has a considerably weaker security than using a third party server. 3) Burdens due to requiring secure channels for registration. In recent authentication schemes [9] , [10] , [14] , the users, the home gateway and smart devices all take part in the registration phase, which requires some secure channels (communicating face-to-face could be considered a secure form). Current schemes assume that the registration rarely happens and thus neglect its associated burden, which could be significant for some cases. For example, a rental Smart Home needs much more registration than others since the house ownership changes more often.
The scheme proposed in this paper aims to address the issues discussed above. Specifically, an anti-tracking and mutual authentication scheme based on the IFTTT Smart Home system model is developed, in which the IFTTT server does not perform user registration or authentication as a trusted third party does; instead, an IFTTT home gateway authenticates remote users via an IFTTT server. The IFTTT Server cannot track the user, and the adversary cannot track the user and the ITFFF home gateway either. The contributions of the work in this paper are as follows. 1) To the authors' knowledge, this is the first work to propose a Smart Home system model in which a home gateway authenticates a remote user, aided by an IFTTT server. 2) To minimize the threat from a compromised IFTTT server, we design an anti-tracking and mutual authentication protocol. In this protocol, an IFTTT home gateway authenticates a remote user privately; the IFTTT server only maintains the home gateway pseudonym list and forwards the authentication messages for them. 3) To overcome the security weakness from exposing an IFTTT home gateway to the Internet, in the proposed model, an IFTTT home gateway is placed behind an IFTTT server logically, in which a remote user sends protected authentication messages to an IFTTT server, and then the IFTTT server re-encrypts and forwards them to an IFTTT home gateway. 4) To avoid the complexity due to requiring secure channels for registration, we develop a remote registration method for the home gateway, and a method requires user registration be limited to a human visual range. 5) The security aspects of the proposed scheme are analyzed, and its performance is evaluated in practical scenarios. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews related work. In Section III, we describe the system model, threat model, the design goals. The proposed scheme is described in Section IV. The security aspects of the proposed model are analyzed in Section V and a proof of the security with the Burrow-Abadi-Needham Logic (BANLogic) and Scyther tool is provided in Section VI. Section VII compares the performances of the proposed scheme and related existing schemes, followed by concluding remarks in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK A. THIRD PARTY AUTHENTICATING A REMOTE USER
Authenticating a remote user via a third party is a common way for Smart Home systems. In 2008, Jeong et al. [31] introduced an integrated authentication server (IAS) to perform authentication, authorization and accounting (AAA) for Smart Homes. This scheme employs hash functions and symmetric encryption algorithms to achieve lightweight authentication. But it sends a user's identity in plaintext, which can be easily traced by an adversary. In 2011, Vaidya and Park [20] adopted the same system model as described in [31] . Lightweight authentication is achieved in a similar way, but the verification table is eliminated from the IAS to improve security. However, the user's identity is still transferred in plaintext. In 2018, Baruah and Dhal [5] proposed an IFTTT-based smart home system model. In this scheme, remote users logon to an IFTTT server to configure recipes and to remotely control the smart devices through the IFTTT server. It tackles the issues associated with a user's compromised device, but all the smart home devices being controlled by the IFTTT server could still be at risk of security breaches. The IAS and IFTTT server are shared among all the smart home users [5] , [20] , [31] . Thus, the IAS and IFTTT server could be the main targets of the adversaries, which may result in severe security problems. Furthermore, they are maintained by the third party, which adds additionally vulnerability.
B. SMART DEVICES AUTHENTICATING A REMOTE USER
Using smart devices to authenticate a remote user directly with or without the help of a third party has become a popular way recently [9] , [11] , [12] . In 2017, Ashibani and Mahmoud [12] proposed an identity-based signcryption to make the authentication between an enduser's device and a smart home device secure. This scheme relies on ECC and bilinear pairing, but does not consider the feasibility of implementing these complex algorithms in resource limited smart devices. In 2018, Chifor et al. [9] proposed a fast identity online (FIDO) based authentication scheme between a user's phone and smart home IoT devices where a password-less authentication protocol is executed. This scheme uses the periodical siblings security scheme which is impractical for implementation in resource limited smart-home devices. Also a strict registration process of smart devices makes it difficult to use. In 2018, Ra and Lee [11] developed an authentication scheme that uses a keyless signature infrastructure (KSI) to let a smart device authenticate a remote user. When there are a large number of smart devices, schemes that rely on smart devices to authenticate a remote user will face a major security issue. For example, Gartner predicted [2] that by 2022, a typical family home may have more than 500 smart devices, for which such schemes are unsuitable.
C. HOME GATEWAY AUTHENTICATING A REMOTE USER
Schemes in which a home gateway authenticates a remote user for smart devices aided by a third party have been proposed recently. A home gateway, as a private property of a user, can be fully controlled by a household, and it has much more resources than smart devices. Thus it can provide stronger security functions. In 2017, Wazid et al. [14] designed a protocol to let a home gateway authenticate a remote user and to build a session key between the user and a smart device. This scheme is based on the successful registration of all entities (a user, a home gateway, a smart device) to a trusted registration authority (RA). Thus, this scheme is not immune attacks from a compromised RA. Additionally, when a user accesses multiple smart devices, the home gateway must authenticate the user for each smart device and then get the session key for each of them. Repeatedly authenticating the same user wastes resources and may result in long delay. Also, this scheme allows a user to directly connect to a home gateway. This process could be exploited by advanced adversaries to gather some information about the activities happening in the smart home through tracing the connection for a period of time.
D. HOME GATEWAY AUTHENTICATING SMART DEVICES
Smart devices authenticated by a home gateway is proposed for dealing with the attacks inside since a home network is an IoT-based local area network. In 2016, Kumar et al. [21] proposed a lightweight and secure session-key establishment scheme between a home gateway and smart devices. To enhance anonymity and security, in 2017, Kumar et al. [22] improved their scheme in [21] to achieve smart devices' anonymity. In 2017, Song et al. [16] proposed a secure authentication scheme between a home gateway and smart devices assisted by chaotic systems. This scheme achieves good security and has a high efficiency. But these schemes are insufficient to deal with issues associated with the remote users.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT A. SYSTEM MODEL
The system being proposed in this paper consists of four entities: user's phone, IFTTT server, IFTTT home gateway and smart devices at home, as shown in Fig. 1 . A user uses his phone to remotely control his smart home system. An IFTTT server maintains all the IFTTT home gateways, finds the requested home gateway for a user, encrypts the request, and forwards the request to the IFTTT home gateway without requiring specific contents. An IFTTT home gateway authenticates the user and responds to the request, with encryption, to the IFTTT server. The server then decrypts it and forwards the decrypted request to the user without acquiring the specific contents. The Smart devices in the home network are managed by the IFTTT home gateway, and they form an independent self-governing system. Thus, if a user wants to control his home, he must be authenticated by the IFTTT home gateway via an IFTTT server, and he sends IFTTT recipes to the home gateway to control his home smart devices.
B. THREAT MODEL
The proposed scheme builds upon the Dolev-Yao threat model [17] , in which any two parties could communicate over an insecure channel. The entities such as a user's phone and the IFTTT server are not considered to be trusted entities. It is assumed that the IFTTT server is interested in the user's information but strictly follows the authentication protocol. An adversary (A) can eavesdrop the exchanged messages, and can also modify or delete the message contents during transmission.
• It is assumed that the standard cryptographic algorithms are secure and unbreakable. For example, the adversary is unable to forge valid hash values or to fabricate affirmed elliptic curve operations without getting a principal's private key. Besides, random numbers are generated (in default) by a function which converts the physical signal into the digitized signal from the network interface, and the hash functions produce pseudo random digest. Hence, it is assumed that the random numbers are unknown to an adversary.
• Assume A can launch active attacks with only part of the secret information. For example, A launches an attack with either a user's smart phone or his password and identity, but not both. Note that logically an IFTTT home gateway stays behind an IFTTT server, and these two entities have no motivation of cooperation to conduct any malicious activities since one is maintained by a house-owner and the other is run by a service provider. Hence, we assume A could either compromise an IFTTT server or impersonate an IFTTT home gateway, but not both at the same time.
• We also assume that the IFTTT home gateway and smart devices cannot be taken away by A since they are installed in home, but A can sniff the network flow and impersonate them. An IFTTT home gateway is assumed to be a trusted entity without any vulnerabilities from malicious attacks since it only connects to the designated IFTTT server with only one type of service (smart home control) via a protected mode (encrypted message).
• In developing the proposed scheme, we focus on a home gateway authenticating a remote user on behalf of the smart devices; communications between a gateway and smart devices are assumed to be secured by other schemes [16] , [21] , [22] .
C. DESIGN GOALS
• Full control. By making users' own home gateways authenticate themselves in a private way, users retain full control of their Smart Homes.
• Easy to install and transfer. By having an IFTTT smart home gateway register to the IFTT server via the Internet, and manage secure communications among the smart devices inside, this scheme lowers users' burden of Smart Home installation and house ownership exchange process. For Smart Home ownership exchanging, a new owner restarts a remote registration for his IFTTT home gateway and updates its users within human visual range. This way the scheme eliminates the complex and generally tedious tasks needed for the user, the home gateway, and the smart home devices.
• Resistance to existing attacks. Considering the possibility of a compromised user (or phone), a compromised IFTTT server, and existing network attacks from adversaries, we introduce multiple factors, such as a user's stored information (user name and password), last session key as context, nonces, utilize multi-technologies, like mutual authentication, ECC algorithm, pseudonym, one time one session key, and keep the authenticating contents secret from the involved IFTTT server, to ensure the authentication scheme is secure against various attacks.
IV. PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we propose an anti-tracking mutual authentication scheme for an IFTTT-based Smart Home (see Fig. 1 ). We first build a secure channel between an IFTTT home gateway and the IFTTT server; then, we design a mutual authenticating protocol that allows the IFTTT home gateway and a remote user to authenticate each other aided by the IFTTT server. The IFTTT server cannot gain the authentication contents when it forwards the authenticating messages. The proposed scheme also achieves unlinkability since user accounts are not maintained in the IFTTT server, and logically the home gateway is hidden behind the IFTTT server. The proposed scheme has three phases: system initialization phase, registration phase, and authentication and key agreement phase. Notations adopted to describe the proposed protocol are listed in Table 2 , the high-level registration and authentication process is shown in Fig. 2 , and the details of the authentication process are showed in Table 3 . 
A. SYSTEM INITIALIZATION PHASE

IFTTT Server initialization:
When an IFTTT Server (S) starts up, it chooses an elliptic curve E p over a finite field F p with a large prime number p, and a secure one-way hash function H 1 (·). S also chooses a base point P with order n over E p , and its private key x and computes P s = xP as its public key. And S keeps x in private, and publishes
IFTTT Home Gateway initialization: The home gateway (HG j ) is assumed to have been configured with public parameters {p, E p , P, P s , n, H 1 (·)} and serial number (SN j ). When HG j starts up, it chooses an elliptic curve E p j over a finite field F p j with a large prime number p j , and a one-way hash function H 2 (·). HG j also chooses a base point P j with order n j and its private key x j , and computes P HG j = x j P j as its public key. And HG j keeps x j in private and stores public parameters
B. REGISTRATION PHASE
The proposed scheme has two separate registration phases: home gateway registration phase and user registration phase. In the home gateway registration phase (see x, y in Fig. 2) , an IFTTT home gateway registers to an IFTTT server to agree upon a pseudonym rID j and the secret H 1 (SN j x) ; in the user registration phase (see z, { in Fig. 2 ), a user registers to an IFTTT home gateway to configure the user identity (uID i ) and the initial authenticated session key (k 0 ij ) within human visual range.
1) HOME GATEWAY REGISTRATION (HGR) PHASE
Step HGR1. HG j generates random numbers rID j , r j and computes mr1 = r j P s and mr2 = r j P. HG j computes
Step HGR2. S computes mr1 * = x · mr2, and obtains SN * j and rID * j from B 1 , B 2 , Then it checks if 
) and sends M 2 = {B 4 , B 5 } back to HG j . S stores rID j as the identity of the home gateway and H 1 (SN j x) as its corresponding secret.
Step HGR3. When HG j receives M 2, it fetches H * 1 (SN j x) from B 4 and then checks whether or not
, fetches its unique hardware address MAC j , and computes R j = H 1 (SN j x) ⊕ H 1 (MAC j ); otherwise, it terminates the process. Finally, HG j stores (rID j , R j ).
2) USER REGISTRATION (UR) PHASE
Step UR1. When a user (U i ) registers to HG j , it generates a random number rC j as its registration code and displays it to U i . Then it sends rID j and the public parameters
Step UR2. U i chooses his password and username denoted as (PW i , UN i ), and inputs PW i , UN i , rC j on U i 's smart phone(SP i ) manually. Then SP i retrieves its hardware address MAC i and computes 
C. AUTHENTICATION AND KEY AGREEMENT PHASE
This process also has two separate phases: home gateway login phase and mutual authentication with key agreement phase. In the home gateway login phase (see |, } in Fig. 2 ), an IFTTT home gateway logs onto an IFTTT server. After mutual authentication, the IFTTT home gateway and IFTTT server agree upon a session key (k SH j ) and the IFTTT server marks it as online. In the mutual authentication with key agreement phase (see~, , , in Fig. 2) , a user and an IFTTT home gateway perform mutual authentication via an IFTTT server, and they agree upon a new session key (k k ij ) in a secret way, not only to the attackers but also to the IFTTT server. The last session key is involved in mutual authentication to prevent impersonation attack.
1) HOME GATEWAY LOGIN (HGL) PHASE
Step HGL1. HG j retrieves H 1 (SN j x) from R j with H 1 (MAC j ), generates a random number r j , computes mr1 = r j P s , mr2 = r j P,
, T 1 }, and sends M 5 to S.
Step HGL2. S first checks the timeliness of T 1 using the condition SN j x) rID j r) , and M 6 = {B 4 , B 5 , T 2 }. S finally sends M 6 to HG j and adds k SH j to its own database for this session key.
Step HGL3. HG j checks the timeliness of T 2 via the condition SN j x) rID j r) , and finally stores k SH j securely.
2) MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION WITH KEY AGREEMENT (AUKA) PHASE
As can be seen from the previous phases, S owns x in private and its public parameters {p, E p , P, P s , n, H 1 (·)}, and stores {rID j , H 1 (SN j x), k SH j } in its database. HG j has x j in private and public parameters {p j , E p j , P j , P HG j , n j , H 2 (·)}, and stores
, and also S's public parameters. U i has (PW i , UN i ) in its storage, and its SP i stores {mID i , mk 0 ij , rID j } and HG j 's public parameters. This phase achieves the goal of mutual authentication with key agreement between HG j and U i aided by S. The authenticating messages between U i and S are encrypted with the shared secrets between U i and HG j , and S just re-encrypts (or decrypts) and forwards the authentication messages and cannot trace the activities happening between U i and HG j . See Table 3 .
Step AUKA1. U i inputs its username (UN i ) and password
ij } with w. SP i generates random number r i , and computes c = r i · P HG j , e = r i · P j . Then it
Step AUKA2. S first checks the timeliness of T 1 through condition |T 1 −T * 1 | ≤ T , where the maximum transmission delay is denoted by T and T * 1 is the reception time of M 7 . If the condition holds, then S finds rID j and forwards mM 7 = {E k SH j (M 7 ), H 1 (M 7 )} to HG j .
Step AUKA3. 
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we prove that the proposed scheme can withstand the following known attacks.
A. USER ANONYMITY
Proof: In the proposed scheme, on the one hand, the IFTTT Server (S) does not maintain any user's (U i ) identity database. On the other hand, suppose the adversary A eavesdrops the messages {rID j , e, O 1 
I. COMPROMISED IFTTT SERVER ATTACK
Proof: Consider a scenario where the IFTTT Server is compromised by an adversary A, who tries to track U i 's activity and gather U i 's remote control commands (or S itself is curious about U i while abiding by the protocol). In our scheme, firstly, the mutually authenticated session key between U i and HG j is unknown to S. Secondly, when U i launches a new authentication procedure via S, he provides nothing about U i 's identity information but HG j 's pseudo-identity rID j , which is a random number. Thirdly, after finishing the authentication, remote control commands that U i sends to HG j are encrypted by the new session key, and are also unknown to S. Accordingly, the proposed scheme ensures U i 's privacy and the security of remote access to smart home system under a compromised IFTTT server attack.
J. HOME GATEWAY IMPERSONATION ATTACK
Proof: Suppose an adversary A gets the valid rID j through sniffing the network. He then tries to impersonate a legitimate IFTTT home gateway (HG j ) to log onto S and perform attacks. A can easily get S's public parameters {p, E p , P, P s , n, H 1 (·)}; however, he has to fetch H 1 (SN j x) .
is stored as a masked value and it is impossible to fetch it without cracking the hardware of HG j . In other words, the proposed scheme has a good resistance to the home gateway impersonation attack.
VI. SECURITY PROOF WITH BAN-LOGIC AND SCYTHER
This section analyzes the security of the proposed scheme with Burrow et al. [35] BAN-logic and the Scyther tool [40] . We prove that the proposed scheme allows the user to securely establish a session key with the IFTTT home gateway. 
A. BAN LOGIC NOTATIONS AND POSTULATES
Suppose that A & B are symbols for principals, X & Y are symbols of statements, P and P s are the symbols of an elliptic curve base point and the public key, respectively. The logic notations of BAN-logic are listed in Table 4 .
The BAN-logic postulates used in this scheme are as follows:
R1: Message-meaning rule1:
. That is, if A believes that B has P as a base point and P s as a public key of an elliptic curve, and A sends the result of y multiplied by P, and receives the result of X XOR the hashed y P s , then A believes B once said X.
R2: Message-meaning rule2:
That is, A receives the result of y multiplied by P as well as the result of X XOR the hashed y P s , where X is a secret known only to A and B, then A believes that B trusts the fact that A and B share X . R3: Nonce-verification rule:
. That is, if A believes the freshness of X and that B once said X, then A believes that B trusts X.
R4: Deducing rule1: 
B. SECURITY PROOF WITH BAN-LOGIC
For convenience, let U , H be denoted as U i , HG j respectively; let k, SNX be denoted as the shared key k SH j and H 1 (SN j x) between HG j and S; and let nsk, osk be denoted as k k ij , k old ij between U i and HG j ; and also let P s , P H be denoted as S's public key and HG j 's public key.
The proposed scheme has two login phases: HG j logs onto S and U i logs onto HG j via S. Each of them executes the key agreement process, and the latter phase (U i 's) is based on the session key of HG j 's login. To make the description more clear, we first combine HG j 's login phase and U i 's login phase to one formalized scheme. We also simplify U i 's login messages by not explicitly describing the messages sent by S, since S only executes encryption or decryption and forwards messages with the session key shared with HG j . The key elements of messages are idealized without including the timestamps, since their checks do not affect the proof. To highlight the key points, we adopt the same symbol <> for H 1 (·), H 2 (·) and r j for HG j 's random number in the two login phases. Although they have the same symbol, they are used in different session without introducing chaos.
The formalized idealized scheme together with the security goals are described next. Initial premises are provided before the proof procedure.
Formalized Idealized Scheme:
With the above BAN-Logic notations, we formalize and idealize M5, M6, M7 and M8 in Fig. 2 into Message1, Message2, Message3 and Message4, respectively, without including the timestamps. Also we introduce two symbols for the shared secrets for simplicity.
Message1: H → S :
If the proposed scheme is secure, then both S and H believe that they negotiate and share k after authentication, and both U and H believe that they negotiate and share nsk after authentication. The goals with BAN-Logic notations are as follows.
Goal1.
Goal4. S| ≡ H
C. SECURITY PROOF WITH SCYTHER
In this section, the Scyther tool is applied to perform a formal analysis of the proposed model. Scyther is an automatic security protocol verification tool, commonly used to identify potential attacks and vulnerabilities. It has been used to verify numerous security protocols. Here the Scyther tool is used to evaluate the following properties of proposed scheme: secrecy, replay attack resistance, man-in-the-middle attack resistance, and reflection attack resistance. Since the user registration protocol is securely performed using a face-toface method, the Scyther tool is used to evaluate the other three protocols: home gateway registration protocol, home gateway login protocol, and mutual authentication with key agreement protocol. Fig. 3 illustrates the results obtained from Scyther's analysis of the home gateway registration protocol. The results clearly show that home gateway registration in the proposed scheme is secure. Results from Scyther analysis of home gateway login protocol between the IFTTT home gateway and the IFTTT server are shown in Fig. 4 . No attacks were observed.
Scyther is finally used to analyze the mutual authentication with key agreement protocol between the user and the IFTTT home gateway via the IFTTT server, and the results are shown in Fig. 5 . These results show that Scyther has not found any weaknesses or potential attacks against the proposed scheme.
We repeated the Scyther verification twenty times, using both the manually defined claims and Scyther's automatically generated claims, and the results remained the same. The Scyther testing codes are provided in the Appendices.
VII. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
In our proposed system model, the scheme without the security techniques follows the same three phases: system initialization phase, registration phase and authentication phase. However, it stores and checks the user name and password directly, which takes negligible computational time compared with the proposed scheme.
In this section, the proposed scheme is compared with related schemes: Baruah and Dhal [5] , Wazid et al. [14] , Jeong et al. [31] , Vaidya and Park [20] , and Zhang et al. [24] during the authentication and key agreement phase. Since the system initialization and registration phases are not frequent, the costs involved in these phases are not discussed. The computational costs are shown in in Table 5 . Similar notations as used by Wazid et al. [14] are adopted here:
T mac denote, respectively, the computational time for hash function (using SHA-1 hashing algorithm), symmetric encryption/decryption, a fuzzy extractor, an elliptic curve point addition, an elliptic curve point multiplication, and message authentication code (MAC). It is also assumed that the bitwise XOR operation time is negligible, and is thus not considered as part of the performance parameters. Parameters used in the experiments [14] , [33] , [34] are: T h = T mac = 0.32ms, T fe = T P m = 17.1ms, and T E /T D = 5.6ms. Based on the results in [36] , one elliptic curve point addition is nearly 11.7 times faster than one elliptic curve point multiplication; thus, T P a = 1.46ms. The scheme by Baruah and Dhal [5] adopts totally different computation. Thus, in the comparison, the computation time published in [5] will be used. The computational cost of the proposed scheme is higher than that of the schemes developed by Wazid et al. [14] , Jeong et al. [31] , and Vaidya and Park [20] , because we introduce the ECC algorithm to enhance security. Since the added computation is required on a user's phone and home gateway which has sufficient computational resources, it is still practical to implement. The three-party authentication in the proposed scheme is faster than Zhang et al. [24] 's scheme, which is designed for two parties based on ECC.
The communication cost of various existing schemes and the proposed scheme are compared in Table 6 . Similar assumptions to the ones made in [14] are adopted here: the identities are of 128-bit long; random nonces are 128 bits; elliptic curve points are 128 bits; timestamps are 32 bits; a plaintext/ciphertext block in symmetric encryption/decryption (using AES-CBC algorithm) is 128 bits, and the hash digest is 160 bits. Since the schemes by Jeong et al. [31] , and Vaidya and Park [20] need to connect a third party to get an authenticated ticket and use it to connect the home gateway to prove and fetch services, it is better to include the ticket proving process. Specifically, in our scheme, messages of the authentication phase are 7 and mM 8 are 896 bits, 352bits, 1056bits, and 512bits, respectively. As a result, the total communication cost of our scheme turns out to be (896 + 352 + 1056 + 512) = 2816 bits. Note that both the two-party authentication scheme by Zhang et al. [24] , and the proposed scheme adopt the ECC algorithm. Our proposed scheme has higher communication cost because a third party is introduced to enhance security and privacy (see Table 7 ). Our scheme has a higher communication cost than the schemes by Jeong et al. [31] because we need extra masking information to resist the attack from the involved compromised third party (the IFTTT server).
The security and privacy features of of the proposed and existing schemes are compared in Table 7 . The scheme by Baruah and Dhal [5] does not provide user anonymity and cannot resist the compromised server attack and the home gateway impersonation attack. The scheme by Wazid et al. [14] is vulnerable to the desynchronization attacks and compromised server attacks. Both the schemes by Jeong et al. [31] and Vaidya and Park do not provide a user with anonymity and un-traceability, and are also insecure to compromised server attacks. The scheme by Jeong et al. [31] does not achieve perfect forward security and the scheme by Vaidya and Park [20] is vulnerable to desynchronization attacks. The scheme by Zhang et al. [24] achieves more security and privacy features than the above schemes, but it lacks a way to prevent a stolen smart phone attack. Overall, the proposed scheme provides better security and privacy than existing schemes.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have presented an IFTTT-based smart home system model and an anti-tracking mutual authentication scheme in this paper. The proposed system model keeps an IFTTT home gateway behind the IFTTT server logically and authenticates a remote user independently. The proposed registration procedure facilitates users to securely configure smart homes, especially in the house ownership exchanging process. The authentication protocol combines multiple factors: user's memory (password), previous session key, serial number and hardware address of the home gateway, to mutually verify the actual communication entities. It achieves anonymity and untraceability aided by the ECC algorithm and nonces. Security analysis, proof of BAN-logic and result of Sytcher tool show that our scheme achieves better security and privacy than existing schemes. Performance comparison result reveals that the proposed scheme is suitable for implementation in practice. recv_1(HGj, S, mr2, B1(H1(mr1), rIDj), B2(H1(mr1), H1(SNj, x)), B3(H1(mr2, H1(SNj, x), Ts))M5(S)); send_2(S, HGj, B4(H1(mr1), r), B5(H1(mr1, H1(SNj,x), rIDj, r, Ts), Ts)M6(HGj)); claim(S,Secret,rIDj); claim(S,Secret,rj); claim(S,Secret,mr1); claim(S,Secret,mr2); claim(S,Secret,SNj); claim(S,Secret,x); claim(S,Secret,r); claim(S,Alive); claim(S,Weakagree); claim(S,Niagree); claim(S,Nisynch); 
